Bruce G. Blair
Strategic Command and Control: Redefining the Nuclear Threat.
Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1985. Second printing. 0815709811 xiv/341 pages.
Softcover volume, measuring approximately 6.25" x 9.25", displays very light shelfwear. Binding is firm. Interior is clean and bright. Illustrated with tables, graphs and maps.
"During the past twenty-five years, U.S. strategists have argued that avoiding nuclear war depends on deterring a Soviet first strike by ensuring that U.S. forces could survive a surprise attack in numbers sufficient to inflict unacceptable damage in retaliation. U. S. military and political leaders have thus emphasized acquiring more powerful and accurate weaponry and providing better protection for it, while defense analysts have focused on assessing the relative strength and survivability of U.S. and Soviet forces. In the process neither has given sufficient attention to the vulnerability of the U.S. command, control, and communications system that would coordinate warning of an attack in progress and the response to it. In this study Bruce G. Blair examines accepted assumptions about mutual deterrence, force strength, and survivability, and concludes that the vulnerability of command, control, and communication not only precludes an effective retaliatory strike but also invites a preemptive Soviet first strike."